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"navigable waters" in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United
States Army Core of Engineers. In light of this decision, Buday submitted
a brief claiming Fred Burr Creek and the surrounding wetlands were
no longer navigable waters, and the United States thus lacked
jurisdiction to prosecute him. The court construed this brief as a
motion to withdraw his guilty plea. The court denied the motion, and
in so doing, found the holding in Solid Waste inapplicable.
In Solid Waste, the Supreme Court held seasonal ponds or wetlands
that were entirely within one state's borders and not adjacent to any
navigable steams or tributaries were not navigable waters within the
meaning of the CWA. However, the district court found that this
definition did not apply to the wetlands surrounding Fred Burr Creek.
Although Fred Burr Creek was not navigable, it drained into Flint
Creek, which in turn flowed into the Clark Fork of the Columbia River.
The Clark Fork was navigable-in-fact; thus Fred Burr Creek was a
tributary of a tributary of a navigable waterway. The CWA specifically
covers such tributaries, and the court cited numerous cases, including
United States v. Texas Pipe Line, which found tributaries such as Fred
Burr Creek within the scope of the CWA envisioned by Congress.
Furthermore, the court held the inclusion of tributaries in the
CWA fell within the boundaries of congressional power dictated by the
Commerce Clause, authorizing Congress to regulate the channels of
interstate commerce. By definition, navigable waters are channels of
interstate commerce. The court reasoned that although Fred Burr
Creek's effect on interstate commerce was minimal, the effect of
tributaries as a whole was not. Thus, in protecting tributaries in the
CWA, Congress was protecting the interests of interstate commerce.
Since Fred Burr Creek was a tributary of a navigable waterway, it
was protected by the CWA even after Solid Waste. Since this protection
is within the powers constitutionally granted to Congress, Mr. Buday's
motion to withdraw his guilty plea was denied.
James Siegesmund

Kandra v. United States, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1192 (D. Or. 2001) (holding
lack of entitlement prevented citizens either from enjoining the
implementation of the Bureau of Reclamation's annual plan for a
water project, or from forcing releases for irrigation without a showing
of probable chance of success on the merits.)
The Upper Klamath Lake ("Lake") provided primary storage for a
limited-capacity water project ("Project") established in 1905. It also
served as a valuable resource to Indian tribes as well as a source of
nourishment and life for endangered and threatened fish and birds.
This suit arose out of problems concerning the allocation of water to
irrigators holding contracts for water from the Project.
The project allowed the Bureau of Reclamation ("Bureau") to
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form contracts with irrigators along both the Klamath and Lost Rivers
in Oregon. The Lake was listed as "critical habitat" for two types of
endangered suckerfish under the Endangered Species Act ("ESA").
These fish provided food, employment opportunities, and a basis for
culture and tradition among the Yurok Indian Tribes. The Yurok and
Klamath Tribes held treaty rights dating back to "time immemorial,"
which secured the Tribes' water and fisheries in the Klamath River
Basin. Furthermore, the river below the terminal dam in the project
provided "critical habitat" for threatened Coho salmon. Finally, two
wildlife refuges far below the Lake depended on water to provide
habitat for waterfowl, a primary food source for threatened bald
eagles.
All of these interests came into conflict when a 2001 Natural
Resources Conservation Service forecast predicted critically dry
conditions that would lead to the lowest inflows to the Lake on record.
This forced the Bureau to severely curtail releases for irrigation in
order to protect fish habitat in the lake and river below the Iron Gate
Dam. Irrigators dependent on such releases protested the Bureau's
2001 plans because they provided little or no water for irrigation.
Kandra sued on behalf of the irrigators for the Bureau, alleging
breach of contract. Kandra further claimed the Bureau's 2001 plan
constituted an arbitrary and capricious use of administrative power
under the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), and was a violation
of both the National Environmental Policy Act ("NEPA") and the ESA.
The Oregon District Court faced the decision of whether Kandra
could bar implementation of the plan by injunction and obtain an
order to release 262,000 acre-feet from the Lake, dropping its
elevation one foot below minimum recommended levels. The Bureau
insisted its plan complied with NEPA and ESA requirements and that
Indian treaty rights antedated irrigators' rights. The Wilderness
Society intervened, arguing the needs of wildlife refuges presented an
even greater challenge to irrigators' claims.
The court decided Kandra could neither bar the plan's
implementation nor order releases because he could not show
probable success on the merits of his case or demonstrate that the
balance of hardships tipped sharply in his direction. Kandra's claims
did not show the requisite "fair chance" at success because they arose
from unfounded assumptions about priority of the Bureau's
responsibilities and incorrect analysis of ESA, APA and NEPA
requirements.
First, the contract between irrigators and the Bureau subjected
water allowances to availability. After satisfying the superceding
environmental demands of the ESA, and the superior Indian treaty
rights, the Bureau had little or no available water remaining for
irrigators.
Second, the court addressed Kandra's claim that the Bureau
violated NEPA by failing to produce an Environmental Impact
Statement ("EIS"). The court held an EIS was not required because
the Bureau's 2001 plan comprised only part of an ongoing process,
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and, thus, the Bureau could not feasibly complete an EIS before
critical deadlines for the delivery of irrigation water had passed.
Therefore, to impose impossible duties on the Bureau made "no
sense."
Lastly, the court challenged Kandra's notion that, because the Fish
and Wildlife Service ("FWS") provided the Bureau with contestable
expert opinions, implementing the 2001 plan violated the ESA and
APA. The ESA prevents the Bureau from engaging in any action likely
to jeopardize the continued existence of endangered or threatened
species. It also requires certain due diligence procedures in forming
water plans, such as including reasonable and prudent alternatives
("RPAs") in those plans. The Bureau relied on experts in the FWS
who formulated RPAs. While Kandra claimed the Bureau's experts
failed to use or correctly interpret the best information available, the
court found this insufficient to prove the Bureau acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in violation of the APA.
The court further held the Bureau's ability to choose and rely on
expert opinions allowed for reasonable discretion, not omniscience.
The ESA simply requires expert opinions not ignore biological
information. Kandra had merely argued certain experts disagreed on
the significance of biological information used by the FWS. Thus, the
court held Kandra's ESA claim sought to impose a standard
inconsistent with the standard actually imposed by law.
Considering all of these factors, the court concluded Kandra's
claim failed to show a likelihood of success on the merits or an
entitlement to the relief sought. Accordingly, the court denied
Kandra's motion for a preliminary injunction.
Dan Wennogle
United States v. Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 144 F. Supp. 2d 46
(D.P.R. 2001) (holding that the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico lacked
jurisdiction over the United States Navy to compel adherence to local
regulations, due to the sovereign immunity of the United States).
The United States moved for a declaratory judgment that the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico ("Commonwealth") and its Secretary
of the Department of Natural and Environmental Resources could not
compel the United States' participation in local administrative
proceedings regarding the adjudication of stream water for use on a
Naval base. The Commonwealth relied on the McCarran Amendment
("Amendment") of 1952, which waived the United States' sovereign
immunity for administrative
proceedings regarding stream
adjudication.
The United States obtained permits granting the
adjudication of stream waters for use on a Navy base in 1942 and 1944,
and thus contended that the permits are not subject to the
Amendment. The court granted declaratory relief.
Congress' purpose in ratifying the Amendment was "allowing states

